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THE QUESTION OF NONRESIDENT TUITION
FOR TRIBAL CITIZENS
J. Youngblood Henderson*
The increase in the number of American Indians entering state-
supported colleges and universities has created new problems for
these traditional institutions, yet these are old problems for the
legal system in America. Most of these new problems are familiar to
the institutions since they revolve around requirements for admis-
sion, financial aid, and socially relevant curricula. But as more
Indians search for relevance in higher education, they must choose
between the instructional competencies of different colleges and
universities for their elected path in life. They are confronted with
a problem as old as the history of the United States: the interrelation-
ship of federal wardship, tribal identity, and the validity of state
regulation.
In the context of state-supported higher education, this problem is
currently manifested in statutory durational residency requirements.
These statutory enactments by the state are utilized to determine
whether a student is a resident or not. If the student is deemed not
to be a resident, then he or she must pay a higher tuition fee to attend
the state-supported school. These statutory schemes, while valid
on their face, when applied to tribal citizens become a suspect class-
ification which conflicts with federally protected rights of tribal
citizenship.
For the last fifteen years, non-Indian students have attacked these
statutory requirements with little success;1 however, there has been
no test case for American Indians yet.
The purpose of this article is to confront the theoretical question
of whether state-supported university systems have a legal right under
federal law to extend a state statutory durational residency require-
ment and classification system2 to tribal citizens, or whether such
extension of the state statutory classification system is an unreason-
able and illegal infringement of the relationship between the federal
government and the Indian tribes. Additionally, this article shall con-
front the question of whether a state has the right to classify tribal
citizens in the categories of residents or nonresidents or whether
such classification conflicts with the comprehensive and preemptive
congressional scheme for regulating tribal affairs. Finally, it will
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address the issue of whether state tuition systems that impose higher
financial burdens on tribal citizens merely because they reside outside
the boundary lines of the state are discriminatory.
The answers to these questions will be discussed, first, from the
unique legal framework which defines the relationship and status of
Indian tribes to both the federal and state governments under Ameri-
can constitutional federalism. Second, this article will analyze the
applicability of state boundaries as standards by which a state may
discriminate between tribal citizens under the protection of the
privileges and immunity clause of the fourteenth amendment, as well
as determine the appropriate judicial test under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Lastly, this article will inaugu-
rate a request for positive action to resolve the present situation.
Background
Chief Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court, in the threshold
analysis of the relationship of the Indians to the federal government,
accurately stated in 1831 that "the condition of the Indians in rela-
tion to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two
people in existence." 3 Today, this statement is still valid, but for
different reasons from those given in 1831. Marshall and his col-
leagues were primarily concerned with problems raised in legal theory
by the unique condition of the tribes. The modem problem is the
lack of uniformity in the numerous treaties and "arrangements"
made with the various tribes and state governments. Second, while
the relationship of the tribes lacks any definitive analysis in terms of
the limitations of federal government intervention in tribal affairs,
the role of the states in federal-tribal affairs appears almost crystal
clear in comparison.
The Supreme Court has consistently condemned any state en-
croachment on essential tribal affairs because Indian tribes are under
the plenary power of the federal government. The regulation of the
affairs of tribal government is an exclusive subject matter completely
under federal control; state regulation is prohibited unless an explicit
act of Congress has delegated part of the federal control to the state
and the tribe consents to the state regulation.4 Thus, the supersession
or preemption doctrine of constitutional law has been applied to
state action in the absence of a statutory delegation of power from
Congress and tribal consent.' The best and most relevant illustration
of the complete domination of the affairs of Indian tribes by the
federal government is the 1886 case of United States v. Kagama.0
Kagama had allegedly murdered a fellow Indian in the boundaries
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of the state of California, but within the limits of an executive-order
reservation. The circuit court, on a certification of division of opinion,
asked the Supreme Court whether federal or state courts had author-
ity to try and punish the Indian on the basis that the offense was
situated wholly within the limits of a state of the Union.
Justice Miller, speaking for the Court, acknowledged that, "It
will be seen at once that the nature of the offense (murder) is one
which in almost all cases of its commission is punishable by the Laws
of the States, and within the jurisdiction of their courts."7 A problem
that Justice Miller saw which distinguished this offense was that "it
is committed on a reservation set apart within the State for residence
of the tribe of Indians by the United States," and that the Indian
offender "belonged to that or some other tribe."8 Because of these
factual circumstances, Miller held that the offense was "within the
competency of Congress" rather than the state courts. He stated:
It does not interfere with the process of the State courts with
the reservation, nor with the operation of State Laws upon white
people found there. Its effect is confined to the acts of an Indian
of some tribe, of a criminal character, committed within the limits
of the reservation....
These Indian tribes are wards of the nation. They are communi-
ties dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their
daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Be-
cause of the local ill feelings, the people of the States where they
are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very
weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing
of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it
has been promised. This has always been recognized by the Execu-
tive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question
has arisen.
The power of the General Government ... must exist in that
government because it never has existed anywhere else, because
the theatre of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the
United States, because it has never been denied and because it
alone can enforce its laws on all the Tribes.9
The complete dominance of the federal interest in regulating
tribal affairs is thus based on the historic necessity of federal-tribal
relationships. This does not mean that Indian tribes have no author-
ity to regulate their affairs. Under the legal doctrine of "inherent,
residual sovereignty of Indian Tribes," the tribes retain exclusive
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jurisdiction over essential matters in the absence of specific congres-
sional limitations. An illustration of this undefined power is found
in the case of Merrill v. Turtle ° where the Navaho Nation was held
to have the sole power to determine extradition of a Cheyenne Indian
to a state because this power bears an "essential and intimate relation-
ship" to tribal self-government.
As an exclusive federal concern, the issue of the parameters of state
action has been fully outlined by the federal courts. The states have
no power to infringe on the federal-tribal relationship because no
such power was allocated to the states in the Constitution of the
United States.-1 In the most recent major decision, McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Commission,2 the Supreme Court held that tribal
citizens and their property on an Indian reservation are not subject
to state taxation, except by virtue of expressed authority conferred
upon a state by a statutory enactment by the Congress of the United
States. Justice Marshall, speaking for the unanimous Court, went to
considerable lengths to establish that by federal treaties and statutes
the Indian tribe was intended to have sovereign powers. Moreover,
these sovereign powers were federally protected to prevent any state
interference or infringement. This decision illustrated, with a great
deal of force, that while the power of taxation is an inherent power of
the states, this power is limited not only by the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Constitution and the state constitution, but the power
is also limited if it infringes on the rights or privileges of an Indian
tribe without specific statutory authority from Congress.
At its foundation, the prohibition against state action which inter-
feres or infringes on the rights of Indian tribes and their citizens is
the legal principle of the inviolability of the federal-tribal compact.1
The federal statutory scheme and various treaties with Indian tribes
show that the tribes have entered into a "confederation" with the
federal government. This confederation can, perhaps, be analogized
to the Articles of Confederation which was the loose compact estab-
lished between the '3 colonies prior to the Constitutional Conven-
tion. The main distinction is that Title 25 of the United States Code
and the collection of treaties signed with tribes prior to 1871 establish
an "informal" confederation agreement, while the United States
Constitution delineates the explicit allocation of powers between
the states and the federal government. Nevertheless, because the
states are not parties to these informal agreements, unless specifically
included by Congress, they have no inherent power over Indian
tribes. Commenting on the essential nature of such a confederation,
Madison stated in Number 4 3 of The Federalist: "The more intimate
the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the
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members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater
right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact
was entered into should be substantially maintained."' 4
The federal government and tribal governments, while disagreeing
on the extent of federal control over inherent tribal authority, have
historically attempted to prevent any interference or infringement
by the states on the terms of their compact. Thus, state power has
been consistently prohibited in areas considered essential and neces-
sary to the growth and evolution of tribal government by the constitu-
tional law doctrine of supersession of federal control. 15
An example of such specific delegation of power to the states by
Congress is Public Law 280.6 This law granted to several states a
limited criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian tribes within those
states. This statutory enactment by Congress, however, was not a
plenary grant and was limited by restrictions which were designed to
protect the federal relationship and power over tribal citizens within
the states. It must be recognized that Public Law 280 only delegated
specific federal responsibilities for Indian affairs and removed specific
federal laws which applied to these tribes. The Act did not terminate
the plenary power of the federal government over these Indian tribes.
To illustrate this point, Congress, in the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968,'17 repealed Section 7 of Public Law z8o which allowed any
state arbitrarily to assert its jurisdiction over the tribal reservation.
This Act made the assumption of jurisdiction by the state contingent
upon the consent of the tribes at special elections:' and allowed for
piecemeal jurisdiction to resolve particular needs of the tribes based
on the resources of the tribe.
Inapplicability of State Boundaries
Viewing the state classification scheme which divides tribal citi-
zens into in-state and out-of-state residents, with the subsequent
financial burden being placed on those determined to have out-of-
state residence, from the perspective of the impact of the preemption
and supersession doctrine, it must be determined whether such classi-
fication is discriminatory. If it is discriminatory, which test should
the courts utilize to determine the validity of the classification
system?
The threshold question is whether any state can utilize its boun-
daries to discriminate against the wards of the federal government.
The boundaries of the various states were determined by both the
states and Congress and are binding on all the respective states and
their citizens. These boundaries silently illustrate where one state
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sovereignty begins and ends while all those sovereignties are subject
to federal control. These boundaries exist as agreements between
the people of the states and the United States. They are not only
sources of political boundaries that make a division of affiliations,
expectations, and loyalties, but are sources which create their own
inevitable corollaries such as lawbreakers and laws. Nonetheless, they
exist solely as legal fictions validated by the consent of both the per-
sons within the boundaries and those outside. This fundamental view
is founded on principles in the Constitution of the United States.
Yet, when viewed from the perspective of the federal-tribal com-
pact, these state boundary lines fade into the ecological boundaries
of the nation that exist between the woods and plains, plains and
mountains, or mountains and deserts. In the federal-tribal perspec-
tive there are only international borders and tribal borders, not state
borders. The validity of this perspective is found in United States v.
Kagama'9 where the Supreme Court did not seek to determine
whether the offender was a California Indian before it passed judg-
ment. Instead, it merely stated that "the fair inference is that the
offending Indian shall belong to that or some other tribe."' 0 The
Court determined that there are no state boundaries when the rights
of the Indian tribes are at issue, because they are "wards of the
nation." This was not a novel interpretation, but rather a consistent
legal doctrine dating back to the case of Worcester v. Georgia in
183z.
While Worcester, the seminal case, concluded that the Indian
tribes were an exclusive federal concern independent of their position
within the boundaries of the state of Georgia, the best illustration of
this doctrine is the case of United States v. Forty-three Gallons of
Whiskey." This case, decided in 1876, concerned the power of an
Indian tribe to insert into a treaty with the federal government a total
prohibition of liquor in the land they ceded to the United States.
The ceded land was subsequently granted to the state of Minnesota
and incorporated as an organized county within and of the state. In
its endeavor to enforce this prohibition in the county, the federal gov-
ernment's right to exercise this power was questioned on the grounds
that it infringed on the rights of the states. Speaking through Justice
Davis, the Supreme Court held that this prohibition was a valid
exercise of federal powers. The rationale of this decision was founded
on the concept that the tribe had affirmatively requested this pro-
vision in the treaty, and it was the duty of the federal government to
protect and enforce the tribal desires, even if such enforcement was
to the detriment of the state. Once again, the fact that the prohibi-
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tion was enforced within the boundaries of the state of Minnesota
was irrelevant. The Court stated:
The fact that the ceded territory is within the limits of Minne-
sota is a mere incident; for the act of Congress imported into the
treaty applies alike to all Indian tribes occupying a particular
country, whether within and without the state lines. Based as it
is exclusively on the Federal authority over subject matter, there is
no disturbance of the principle of State equality.' 2
In short, in an area of exclusive federal authority the federal-tribal
compact is "lodged solely with Congress and unrestricted as it is by
State lines.123
While Forty-Three Gallons deals with tribal authority to request
treaty provisions an earlier case, United States v. Holliday,2 4 illus-
trates the power of congressional control on tribal citizens. In Holli-
day it was contended that the sale of liquor to an Indian who lived
in the state outside of the boundaries of the reservation and who
voted in state elections and paid taxes was a matter of state regulation,
with which Congress had no authority. The Supreme Court rejected
this contention and held that congressional power was not confined
to any locality; rather, it extended within the limits of the state to
regulate the intercourse between individual members of the Indian
tribes and citizens of state and federal governments. In regard to
the matter of the power of a state to regulate the affairs of a tribal
citizen, the Court delineated:
Neither the Constitution of the State nor any act of its legisla-
ture, however formal or solemn, whatever rights it may confer on
those Indians or withhold from them can withdraw them from the
influence of an act of Congress which that body has the constitu-
tional right to pass concerning them. Any other doctrine would
make the legislature of the State the supreme law of the land,
instead of the Constitution of the United States, and laws and
treaties made in pursuance thereof.25
Both of these cases illustrate that the federal government's power
is supreme in Indian affairs. They illustrate that regardless of whether
a treaty or the general regulatory power of Congress is involved, the
result is the same. Moreover, they illustrate that the federal court
will enforce tribal rights and liabilities regardless of state boundaries.
State boundary lines are nonexistent in the federal-tribal compact.
It should also be added that certain international boundaries dis-
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appear as well, especially the Canada-United States border to the
Eastern Indian under the Jay Treaty.26
A modem example of federal courts limiting state interference
with the rights and privileges of tribal citizens in terms of tuition
at a state institution of higher education is Tahdooahnippah v.
Thimmig.27 The right involved in Tahdooahnippah was the grant of
certain lands to Colorado by an act of Congress. The land, a former
site of a Federal Indian School, was given with a condition that the
state maintain an institution where ".. . Indian pupils shall at all time
be admitted to such school free of charge for tuition and on terms
of equality with white pupils. '28 In 19o6, the state accepted the land
with this condition, but in 1972 the legislative assembly passed a
bill which limited the tuition waiver to "Indian students who were
Colorado residents who needed such financial assistance." 29 The
federal government brought suit against the state on the grounds that
such statutory limitation by the state violated the terms of the grant,
which was a contractual relationship. The federal district court
agreed, holding that a contract did exist which was to be enforced.
Moreover, the court held that under the contract the state of Colo-
rado could not define Indians based on residency nor financial need.
Under the contract, the court held, the state had undertaken the
obligation to educate all Indian students, regardless of residence,
tuition-free.30 The state of Colorado appealed to the federal court of
appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court
on the grounds that the acceptance of the grant by the state created
an obligation of the state to provide free tuition to federal wards as
embodied in the statute. This obligation could not be altered by
the state. It also affirmed that any interpretation of "Indian" based
on residence and boundaries of the state of Colorado was in violation
of the contractual obligations.
These cases illustrate that the boundaries of the states are not a
legally acceptable standard by which to discriminate against children
of Indian tribes, or to validate an interpretation of the state of its
responsibilities to tribal citizens.
Residence Classification Discriminatory
Having illustrated the legal inapplicability of state boundaries as
standards to discriminate against citizens of Indian tribes, we shall
turn to the fourteenth amendment for a solution to this discrimina-
tion. The out-of-state tuition classification invidiously discriminates
against citizens of Indian tribes because it places a higher financial
burden on the basis of the geographic locations of the residence of
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the tribal citizen, his parents, or the Indian tribe. Neither the Bureau
of Indian Affairs31 nor indigent parents, in most cases, are willing or
able to pay the higher tuition fee, and as a consequence, children are
deprived of privileges and immunities of federal citizenship and
trusteeship granted to them by Congress. Moreover, as education is a
fundamental interest in the federal government's plan to further
develop the tribes, the state classification system infringes on an area
considered essential and necessary to tribal government."
"No State," the first section of the fourteenth amendment declares,
"shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." In Twinning v. New
Jersey,33 the Supreme Court held that the rights encompassed by the
privileges and immunities clause are only those arising out of the
nature and essential character of the national government, or alter-
natively, those specifically granted or secured to all citizens by the
United States Constitution or federal laws. Most important of these
rights and privileges of national citizenship which may not be in-
fringed by state action are the right to pass freely from state to state
and the right to inform the federal authorities of violation of its laws.
The most important exclusion of rights to citizens of the states are
the first eight amendments. In the Slaughter-House Cases34 it was
held that the first eight amendments to the Constitution were not
"privileges and immunities of national citizenship" so as to protect
citizens of a state from action under the fourteenth amendment
privileges and immunity clauses. This case created a reliance on the
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment in civil rights cases as it seems to foreclose protection of citizens
of the state from discriminatory state action.
In the case of citizens of Indian tribes, it appears, nevertheless, to
be an adequate remedy to state action.35 As Justice Miller observed
in the Slaughter-House Cases, "[T]he distinction between citizen-
ship of the United States and citizenship of a state is clearly rec-
ognized and established by [the] first section of the [fourteenth
amendment].
Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without
being a citizen of a State, but an important element is necessary to
convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the state
to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should
be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the
Union.
It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United
States and a citizenship of a state, which are distinct from each
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other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circum-
stances in the individual. 8
It was just the different characteristics and circumstances of tribal
citizens which have prevented them from becoming citizens of a
state, while being considered after 1924 as citizens of the United
States. That tribal citizens were not regarded as citizens of either the
United States or the states before the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment is clear. In Dred Scott v. Sandford,7 Chief Justice Taney
explained:
Although they were uncivilized, they were yet a free and in-
dependent people, associated together in nations or tribes, and
governed by their own laws.... These Indian governments were
regarded and treated as foreign governments.... It is true that the
course of events has brought the Indian tribes within the limits of
the United States under subjection to the white race; and it has
been found necessary, for their sake as well as our own, to regard
them as in a state of pupilage .... But they may without doubt,
like subjects of any other foreign government, be naturalized by
the authority of Congress, and become citizens of a state, and of
the United States; and if an individual should leave his nation or
tribe, and take up his abode among the white population, he would
be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong to
an emigrant from any other foreign people.38
After the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, it was strongly
contended that the tribal citizens could become state citizens by
severing their tribal relations and submitting themselves completely
to the jurisdiction of a member state of the United States. This con-
tention was subsequently annulled by the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee Report which held that the fourteenth amendment had no effect
whatever upon the status of Indian tribes because they were never
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in the first place.80
This position was affirmed by the federal court and the Supreme
Court in United States v. Osborne" and Elk v. Wilkins.41 In Os-
borne, the conclusion was:
[A]n Indian cannot make himself a citizen of the United States
without the consent and cooperation of the [federal] government.
The fact that he has abandoned his nomadic life or tribal relations
and adopted the habits and manners of civilized people may be a
good reason why he should be made a citizen of the United States
but does not of itself make him one.42
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Mr. Justice Gray expounded the same principles for the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1884:
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States,
members of, and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian
tribes (an alien, though dependent, power), although in a geo-
graphical sense born in the United States, are no more 'born in
the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' within
the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
than the children of subjects of any foreign government born
with the domain of that government.... Such Indians, then, not
being citizens in the second way mentioned in the Fourteenth
Amendment, by being 'naturalized in the United States,' by or
under some treaty or statute.43
Obtaining citizenship by treaty was attempted on several occasions
during the century of treaty-making, but these terms were usually too
indefinite to make clear the intentions of the federal government in
this matter.44 In any case, the citizenship granted to Indians was
United States citizenship, not state citizenship, and usually discre-
tionary or conditional. Statutory citizenship, i.e., naturalization, after
1871, was still discretionary and United States citizenship.4 5 The
most inclusive act, passed June z, 1924,46 provided that
... all non-citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the
United States be, and they are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States: Provided, that the granting of such citizenship
shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of an
Indian to tribal or other property.
The citizenship rights obtained by tribal citizens was federal citi-
zenship, i.e., United States citizenship. But as Justice Van Deventer
stated for the Supreme Court, that United States citizenship ". . . is
not incompatible with tribal existence or continued guardianship,
and so may be conferred without completely emancipating the In-
dian or placing them beyond the reach of Congressional regulation
adopted for their protection."4 7
One of the purposes of Public Law 28o was to permit tribal citizens
to become full and equal citizens of their respective states; but in
contrast to this laudable goal discussed in the House of Representa-
tives Report,4 8 the Act did not remove the trust status of the reserva-
tion or the prohibitions against the alienation, encumbrance, or
taxation of any real or personal property in a manner inconsistent
with any federal treaty, agreement, or statute.49 One of these property
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1976
rights is the right to retain tribal citizenship rather than accepting
the alternative of state citizenship.
Thus, as long as an Indian remains in volitional allegiance to his
tribe he is a United States citizen as well as a tribal citizen. He may
reside within the boundaries of a state, but he cannot be considered
a citizen of the state unless he expatriates himself from the tribe and
asserts his volitional allegiance and intent to become a citizen of that
state.
The classification of tribal members into out-of-state and in-state
resident categories violates the right of a tribal citizen as a federal
citizen to travel throughout the United States to attend the best
public schools to further his education. Moreover, as the federal
government has not seen fit to establish an institution of higher edu-
cation for Indians, but rather to allocate land to the various states for
them to create such institutions, it would appear that as solely
federal-tribal citizens, Indians would have an inherent right and
privilege to be exempt from out-of-state tuition charges by any state
university. Thus, any state-supported institution of learning should
not be allowed to abridge the privilege of tribal citizens, unless the
state can point to a congressional statute which permits the state to
infringe on the exclusive power of Congress over Indian affairs.
The issue of residence in regard to the right of a tribal citizen of
an Indian tribe to county welfare assistance has been raised in Acosta
v. County of San Diego." In this 1954 case, a Mission Indian
residing on the Pala Reservation sued to establish her rights to county
welfare assistance. The California District Court of Appeals held that
the special jurisdictional relationship between the federal govern-
ment and Indian tribes did not preclude the Indians from meeting
the state residency requirement for receipt of county welfare assis-
tance. The court also stated that the extension of state jurisdiction
was limited to matters which do not interfere with controls exercised
by the federal government over Indian reservations.51 The validity
of the residence requirement is highly questionable, for in 1969, in
the case of Shapiro v. Thompson,5 2 the Supreme Court held that the
residence requirements, which penalize the exercise of constitutional
rights by new residents by disqualifying them from some vital govern-
mental benefit that is necessary to life, are invalid and unconstitu-
tional. The durational residency requirements for public welfare,
which did so discriminate, were unconstitutional. While the courts
have rejected this theory in cases brought by state citizens question-
ing out-of-state tuition, the legal and impoverished circumstances of
tribal citizens within the United States are conducive to the applica-
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tion of the Shapiro v. Thompson test to state systems of higher educa-
tion as they prevent the exercise of a tribal right.
Justification of Classification System
The out-of-state tuition classification system is appropriate to state
citizens because they have agreed to the various boundaries of state
sovereignty within the United States and residence in a state means
access to a state-supported school. But the classification system clearly
discriminates against tribal citizens without congressional authority
in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Congress has not enacted a statute which legitimates such
distinction between tribal citizens in any state institution of higher
learning. In fact, the federal agency in charge of tribal citizens, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, has absolutely rejected paying out-of-state
tuition for children of tribal citizens, presumably because it is dis-
criminatory for a state institution to distinguish between tribal
citizens based on any considerations of state boundaries. As previ-
ously discussed, in the federal-tribal compact there exist no state
boundaries.
Assuming that there may exist a legitimate state interest in the
classification system which is not in violation of the comprehensive
and preemptive congressional power, the state must prove a com-
pelling state interest in their classification system to justify it. This is
not an easy task. First, education of tribal citizens has been declared
by Congress as a national goal and an urgent fundamental interest.
The state of California has already established education as a funda-
mental interest. Because education of tribal citizens is a fundamental
or basic right as defined by Congress and the state of California, a
compelling state interest is required to infringe on the right. But,
irrespective of a fundamental interest, the classification is subject to
strict scrutiny: when applied to tribal citizens, it is based on the
"suspect'? criterion of discrimination on the basis of nationality,
alienage, and race. A court must view any state infringement on
tribal affairs which distinguishes between tribes based on state boun-
daries, through a classification system, with strict scrutiny.
In the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act
of 1975, 53 Congress declared in Section 3(c) that:
[A] major national goal of the United States is to provide the
quantity and quality of educational services and opportunities
which will permit Indian children to compete and excell in the
life areas of their choice, and to achieve the measure of self-
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determination essential to their social and economic well-being.
[Emphasis added.]
This Act was a result of congressional determination that "the
Indian People will never surrender their desire to control relations
among themselves and with non-Indian governments, organizations,
and persons." 54 Moreover, Congress affirmed that "true self-determi-
nation in any society of people is dependent upon an educational
process which will insure the development of qualified people to
fulfill meaningful leadership roles."' ' This is a clear statutory man-
date that Indian education is a national fundamental interest for the
development of tribal citizens and their government. This funda-
mental interest is the supreme law of the land and binds all the states
to participate affirmatively to provide educational services to fulfill
the proclaimed goals. California has already determined that educa-
tion is a fundamental interest in Serrano v. Priest"0 and for Indian
children in Piper v. Big Pine School District.57 Therefore, there is
little question that the "quantity and quality" of Indian education is
a fundamental interest to be protected by the federal government
from state interference or infringement.
It is an established constitutional law doctrine that a statute that
treats persons differently based on their nationality, alienage, or race
is "suspect," and that even though it is enacted pursuant to a valid
state interest, it bears a heavy burden of justification and will be
upheld only if it is necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the
accomplishment of a permissible and important state policy. To
distinguish between tribal citizens based on their alleged residence in
states required a demanding, extraordinary justification. The resi-
dence of Indian tribes, like their race, is beyond their control today.
The residence of Indian tribes in states is a neutral factor. It is a
direct result of a federal-tribal compact based on tribal desires and
the administrative convenience of the federal government before
the states came into existence. The states can neither praise nor blame
Indian tribes for their residency, therefore, it should not be a legiti-
mate basis for granting rewards or imposing penalties.
The Supreme Court has not distinguished among classifications
based on national ancestry, ethnic origin, and race, but has held all
of these to be suspect under the equal protection clause. 8 But there
can be little doubt that all of these are applicable to Indian tribes as
a "discrete and insular" minority.0 9 As the Supreme Court has struck
down Pennsylvania and Arizona statutes which, respectively, denied
welfare assistance to resident aliens who were noncitizens of the
United States, as well as to noncitizens who had not resided in the
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United States for fifteen years,6 0 it would be a strange construction
to deny such protection to Indian tribes. In the same line of thought,
in Jagnandan v. Giles," the federal district court held that imposition
of higher tuition rates by a state-supported university on in-state
aliens than those charged in-state citizens violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. In this case, the court
rejected a reasonable classification for a compelling state interest test.
Moreover, the court found the statutory classification system violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The same results must be applied to tribal citizens. No state should
be able to impose a greater financial burden on tribal citizens solely
because of their parental and tribal residency. Residency of their
parents and tribes are a matter of the plenary power of Congress and
tribal consent. Any distinctions made by the state to the detriment
of tribal citizens are inherently suspect as violative of the equal pro-
tection clause.
On June 27, 1975, the Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit 62
held that a state may not, through residency requirements, disen-
franchise tribal citizens from voting in county elections, even if they
reside on a part of the reservation, rather than the county. If the tribal
citizens have a substantial interest in such elections, they have a right
to make a choice by voting to determine the elected official who will
have some control over them. Rejecting the rational basis test of the
district court as well as its conclusion, the appeals court held that a
compelling state interest is needed to disenfranchise those tribal
citizens through a residency requirement and prevent them from
manifesting their choice. The same result is seen in the instance of
residency requirements determining tuition rates.
Conclusion
There appears to be no reasonable or compelling state interest for
classifying students from an Indian tribe within the United States
as out-of-state students and charging to those Indian students the
higher tuition rate. The regulation of Indian affairs is an exclusive
federal concern, unless delegated to the state; thus, any interest of
the states is subordinated to Congress.
There are no existing federal statutes which can validate the
intervention of state classification on tribal citizens for the purposes
of determining residence. Yet, most states have not attempted to
evaluate their tuition classification systems in regard to tribal citizens,
even though some state-supported colleges have created some Ameri-
can Indian Studies or Native American Study courses. It is time that
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such a reevaluation be initiated by either the federal government or
Indian tribes. Tribal citizens are being denied the right to attend the
institution of higher education of their choice by both the policies
of the educational departments of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and
the statutory authority of the various states. It appears clearly incon-
sistent to penalize the beneficiaries of the Indian Self-Determination
and Educational Assistance Act of 1975, which seeks to utilize the
competencies of state institutions of higher learning, by requiring
them to pay the more costly out-of-state tuition based on state
boundaries.
The problem appears not as a calculated plot but rather as a new
situation in which the older, valid classification system, in part, has
become discriminatory to one group. This situation should be cor-
rected in line with federal policy and the rights and privileges of tribal
citizens. To assume that the durational residence of a tribal citizen
at a state university is not an immediate and pressing need for the
preservation of his tribe is to ignore the congressional mandates of
the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act of
1975. Moreover, to assume that by attending a state university a tribal
citizen must renounce his tribal citizenship and residency and accept
state citizenship and residency is a violation and infringement of his
tribal rights as given in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and
the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924. The distinction made which
validates the residence requirement in some decisions, on the basis
that it is a reasonable attempt to achieve a partial equalization be-
tween those who pay taxes and contribute to a state's economy and
those who do not, is utterly without merit in the circumstances of
Indian tribes under the federal-tribal compact.
NOTES
i. Non-Indian students attending universities or colleges in states different from
their parents' established residency, have challenged these state-created requirements
on the grounds that such classification and requirements were unconstitutional viola-
tions of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, as
well as unconstitutional interference with the right of state citizens to interstate travel
and commerce. Despite these attempts, the courts have consistently upheld the consti-
tutionality of such durational residency requirements. The rationale was that the higher
tuition differentials which nonresident students must pay, for essentially the same edu-
cation, is meant to equalize the burden between state taxpayers and nontaxpayers.
Moreover, through utilizing tuition differentials, the state is attempting to make
nonresident students pay that share of their education which resident students, or their
parents, have paid through state taxes. These tuitional differentials have been viewed
by the courts as a reasonable means for retarding an undesired influx of out-of-state
students to limited facilities in higher education within a state, thereby insuring and
affording a greater number of places in the system for residents.
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The courts have uniformly found the durational residency requirement and the
higher tuition differential to be a reasonable method of classifying students which is
rationally related to the legitimate objective of partial cost equalization between state
taxpayers and nontaxpayers. It should be noted, however, that these cases have created
the development of compacts between states, such as the Southern Regional Education
Board, which waive the nonresident tuition differentials for students enrolling in
graduate programs not offered in their home state.
There are unresolved legal questions concerning residency classification systems.
These questions revolve around the criteria for determining residence and the validity
of a stricter domicile test, which many states are adopting in place of residency criteria.
Domicile requires intent to become a state citizen, while residency requirements and
criteria denote temporal bodily occupancy within the state for a specified length of
time. Both of these classification systems are repugnant to the federal-tribal compact
and shall be dealt with as the same in this paper. See Starnes v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp.
234 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971); Kirk v. Board of Regents,
273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 26o (1969), hearing denied C.A. No. 25734
(Cal. 1969), appeal dismissed for lack of federal question, 396 U.S. 554 (1970); Kline
v. Vlandis, 346 F. Supp. 526 (D. Conn. 1972), reversed 93 S.Ct. 2230 (1973);
Hooban v. Boling, 371 F. Supp. iii (D. Tenn. 1973), af'g 503 F.zd 648 (6th Cir.
1974); Montgomery v. Douglas, CA. No. 74-F-72o (D. Colo. 1974); Covell v.
Douglas, 5o P.2d 1047 (D. Colo. 1972); Hasse v. Board of Regents, 363 F. Supp.
(D. Hawaii 1973); Clarke v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 883 (D. Iowa 1966); Hayes v. Board
of Regents, 362 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. Ky. 1973); Peletetreau v. Savage, 381 F. Supp.
58z (D. N.H. 1974); Robertson v. Board of Regents, 350 F. Supp. 1oo (D. N.M.
1972); Weaver v. Kelton, 357 F. Supp. .io6 (E.D. Tex. 1973); Walters v. Hoover,
C.A. No. 69 -C-3o4 (D. Wis. 1970); Sturgis v. State, 368 F. Supp. 38 (W.D. Wash.
1973); Haper v. Board of Regents, 3o8 Ariz. 223, 495 P.2d 453 (1972); Weitzel v.
State, 3o6 So. 2d 188 (Fla. App. 1974); Twist v. Redeker, 406 F. 2d 878 (CA. Idaho
1969); Newman v. Board of Education, 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (196o); Thompson
v. Board of Regents, 187 Neb. 252, 188 N.W.zd 840 (1971).
2. For an example of these state statutory codes, see CAL. EDUC. CODF §§ 23054,
23055, 23056 (West, 1969):
§ 23054. "Resident student" defined; determination of resident status
"'A resident student' means any person who has been a bona fide resident of the
State for more than one year immediately preceding the opening day of a semester
during which he proposes to attend the university.
"The residence of each student shall be determined in accordance with the rules
for determining residence prescribed by Sections 243 and 244 of the Government Code.
The residence of an unmarried minor who has a parent living cannot be changed by
either his own act or that of his guardian, except that:
"(a) Where immediately prior to first entering any California institution of higher
learning the minor child has lived with and been in the continuous direct care and
control of any person or persons other than a parent for a period of not less than tvo
years, the residence of the minor child is the residence of the persons or persons having
such care and control after the expiration of that two years. As used in this subdivision,
'California institution of higher learning' means any public or private university, college,
or junior college in the State.
"(b) Any person who qualifies for residence status under subdivision (a) of this
section or under Sections 243 and 244 of the Government Code shall not lose such
residence status by virtue of his marriage to a nonresident who lives in California nor
shall such person be required to re-establish residency upon reaching his or her majority.
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"(c) Any minor child, a citizen of the United States, or any alien, who is a minor
child, who has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence in
accordance with all applicable provisions of the laws of the United States, who does not
receive and has not for a period of more than one year immediately preceding the open.
ing day of a semester during which he proposes to attend the university received,
directly or indirectly, any support or financial assistance from his father, if the minor
lives with his mother, who is and has been for a period of more than one year immedi-
ately preceding the opening day of the semester actually present in the State with the
intention of making her permanent home therein, is a resident student. (Stats. 1959,
c. 2, p. 1385, § 23054. Amended by Stats. 1961, c. 915, p. 2539, § 2.)
"§ 23055. Alien students; classification of certain students as resident students
"Every alien student is deemed to be a nonresident student unless he has been
lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence in accordance with all
applicable provisions of the laws of the United States.
"Nothing in this section or in Sections 243 and 244 of the Government Code
prevents the regents from causing to be classified as a resident student any alien who has
been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence in accordance
with all applicable provisions of the laws of the United States or any citizen of the
United States if such citizen or alien has attained his majority in accordance with the
laws of this State and for a period of one year immediately preceding the opening day
of a semester during which he proposes to attend the university, has been entirely self-
supporting and actually present in the State, with the intention of acquiring a residence
therein. (Added by Stats. 1961, c. 915, p. 2540, § 4.)
"§ 23056. Administration of oaths for taking testimony relative to residence status
"The general counsel for the Regents of the University of California and any
person appointed by him for the purpose of ascertaining the residence status of students
and prospective students of the university may administer oaths or affirmations in con-
nection with the taking of testimony relative to any residence status. (Stats. 1959, c. 2,
p. 1386, § 23056. Amended by Stats. 1961, c. 626, p. 1784, § 3.)"
Residence in the Government Code is defined in Sections 243 and 244:
"§ 243. Residence. Every person has, in law, a residence. (Stats. 1943, c. 134, p.
901, § 243.)
"§ 244. Determination of place of residence. In determining the place of residence
the following rules are to be observed:
"(a) It is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other
special or temporary purpose, and to which he returns in seasons of repose.
"(b) There can only be one residence.
"(c) A residence cannot be lost until another is gained.
"(d) The residence of the father during his life, and after his death the residence of
the mother, while she remains unmarried, is the residence of the unmarried minor child,
provided that when the parents are separated, the residence of the parent with whom
an unmarried minor child maintains his place of abode is the residence of such un-
married minor child.
"(e) The residence of the husband is the residence of the wife, provided that a
married woman who is separated from her husband may establish her own residence.
"(f) The residence of an unmarried minor who has a parent living cannot be
changed by his own act.
"(g) The residence can be changed only by the union of act and intent. (Stats.
1943, c. 134, p. 901, § 244, as amended Stats. 1965, c. 1765, p. 3950, § I.)"
The statutes on their face seem appropriate, but for a tribal citizen and resident
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they may cause him to lose his federal and tribal benefits. If every person has, in law,
a residence, as CAL. Gov'T CODE § 244(a), then what is the residence, in law, of a
tribal citizen? The tribal reservation or a state? This problem is compounded by §§
24 4 (b), (c), and (g), which state that a residence cannot be lost until another is
gained, that a person can only have one residence, and that the one residence can only
be changed by the union of act and intent. This could be construed as depriving the
tribal citizen of his tribal identity and rights if he accepts residence in the state of
California or other states to gain lower tuition.
This loss of tribal identity has its precedent in the Eastern states, vhen tribal citizens
recorded their land under colonial or state records. The theory behind such recordation
of tribal land was merely to reduce tensions and questions concerning the ownership
of land, but at a subsequent date the jurists construed the recordings as evidence of
expressed consent to state jurisdiction. This writer submits that the same theory of
residency of the state might have the same effect on contemporary tribes. Indian tribes
exist solely because their members assert their tribal personal sovereignty to the tribe
and not to the state. RosEBUD Sioux TRIBAL CONST., Preamble; F. COHEN, FEDERAL
INDrAN LAw 12z (1945). If tribal citizens by "the union of act and intent" assert this
allegiance to a state, this might weaken, if not destroy, the notions of tribal sovereignty.
This would be especially true under § 23056 of the CAL. EDuc. CODE. As both citizen-
ship and residence are a matter of intention and it has been held that a "floating inten-
tion" is insufficient to overcome undisputed evidence of facts establishing actual
residence, tribal citizens must be wary of such potential harms of asserting any allegi-
ance to the states.
It should be noted that unmarried minors whose parents are members of the federal
military services stationed in California are deemed residents of the state during the
duration of the parents' stay. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 23057. The same standards ought to
apply for a tribal citizen away from his tribe seeking to complete his education.
3" Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831).
4. Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (1858), rev'd, 358 U.S. 217
(1959). The Court held that "[A]bsent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them" (Id. at 2zo). This has usually been called
the "infringement test" by the courts and legal scholars where the courts balance the
state and federal interests in Indian affairs. See Warren Trading Post v. Tax Comm'n,
380 U.S. 685 (1965) (Court reversed Arizona Supreme Court attempt to use
Williams test to extend state's taxation power onto the Navaho Reservation because of
federal preemption); State ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (1969) (Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held Arizona could not extradite an Indian fugitive to
Oklahoma after tribe had refused extradition. Tribal legislation preempted the state.)
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (Court held tribal
citizens on reservations are not subject to state taxation except by virtue of expressed
authority conferred on state by act of Congress.) See also, in the unique Alaskan
context, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S., (1962) and Metlakatla Indian
Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 75 (1962).
5. The suppression doctrine holds that Congress has the power to either permit state
regulation or to prohibit, by expressed statute or by implication, state regulation. To
the extent that Congress has prohibited state regulation, the federal power is exclusive
and no state regulation is allowed. In the context of tribal rights, the supersession of
state law results because Congress has acted under the Indian commerce clause (U.S.
CoNsT., art. I, § 8, 61. 3) and the supremacy clause (U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2) to
provide complete regulation of the subject matter. See note 4 supra.
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6. 138 U.S. 375 (3886). This case holds that the federal government's preemption
or supersession of state law over tribal citizens was constitutional.
7. Id. at 383.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 383-85.
10. 413 F.zd 683 (9 th Cir. 1969). See also note 4 supra.
12. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3, See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 350, 379
(6 Pet) 515, 559 (1832). See also F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 89 (1945).
12. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
13. The conceptualization of the federal-tribal compact is this writer's attempt
to illustrate the dual role under which the federal government operates in American
constitutional federalism. On the one hand, the United States Constitution forges a
compact between the federal government and the states. On the other hand, the tribal-
federal treaties and federal statutes form the substance of the federal-tribal compact.
It is because the tribes were limited by the Constitution from entering treaties with the
states, that the federal preemption is plenary. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (exclud-
ing Indians not taxed from apportionment); art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (grants Congress power
over commerce with Indian tribes); § 1o, cl. 1 ("No State shall enter into any treaty,
alliance or confederation. . ."); § io, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without consent of
Congress,... enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign
power").
14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (A. Hamilton).
15. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
16. Act of Aug. 15, 19 5 3, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, codified in part as i8 U.S.C. § I 16z
(1970) and z8 U.S.C. § 136o (1970).
17. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 301-22, 401-4o6, 8z Stat. 73,
78-80, codified 25 U.S.C. §§ 1311-12, 1313-16, amending z8 U.S.C. § 136o (1970).
18. Id. at § 406, 82 Stat. at 8, codified at z 5 U.S.C. § 1326 (1970).
19. 118 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1886).
2o. Id. at 383 (emphasis added).
21. 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 188 (1876).
22. Id. at 196.
23. Id.
24. 70 U.S. (3 Wall) 407 (1866).
25. Id. at 419.
26. The arguments in these cases involving the Canada-United States border are
similar to the arguments of the federal-tribal compact. See Akins v. Saxbe, 380 F.
Supp. 1io (D. Me. 1974), No. 74-11-03228 (U.S. Custom Ct.) (holds that
Article III of Jay Treaty is still in force and confers an exemption on American Indians
from the payment of duties of goods bought in Canada.) Also see McCandless v.
United States, 25 F.zd 71 ( 3d Cir. 1928), aff'g 18 F.2d. z8z (E.D. Pa. 1927).
27. 481 F.2d 438 (1973), affg CA. No. C-3846 (D. Colo. 1973).
28. Id. at 439, citing 36 Stat. 269.
29. Id.
30. C.A. No. 3-3846 (D. Colo. 1973).
31. The Higher Education Assistance Program of the Bureau of Indian Affairs is
authorized under two legislative acts. The first source is the Act of June 18, 1934, 48
Stat. 986, 25 U.S.C. 471, which authorizes a program of assistance by educational
loans. The second source is the Snyder Act, 2 5 U.S.C. 13, which provides for monetary
grants to students in higher education. There are two classes of Bureau aid that is avail.
able to tribal citizens. These are loans and grants. Educational loans are administered
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under the provision of 47 BIA Manual io. Grant funds which may cover tuition,
subsistence, required fees, textbooks, and miscellaneous expenses relating to atten-
dance at college, are administered under 6z BIA Manual 5. The regulations are general
and on their face do not restrict tribal citizens to institutions of higher learning in the
state in which their tribal reservation is located. In fact, § 32.1, part 3z, ch. I, tit. 25
of the Code of Federal Regulations was revised on June 4, 1968, "to permit the
extension of higher education aids to Indian students in schools of their own free
choice." 33 F.R. 9708. Nevertheless, the Bureau, faced with more eligible applicants
than available funds, has developed a priority for "reservation-based undergraduates
who are in good standing at a level of assistance to permit attendance at a public-
supported within-state institution." Letter from Leroy Falling, Higher Education
Assistance Specialist, Nov. 4, 1975- The reasoning behind this priority is that this
category of student is in the most need of assistance because of isolation and lack of
experience in seeking other funding. Moreover, in many cases, tribes are given the
responsibility to establish priorities. Economic realities, in short, create a public-
supported within-state limitation on the Bureau's Higher Education Assistance Pro-
gram to tribal citizens. The public-supported within-state institutional costs are the
standards by which out-of-state or private college tuition costs are evaluated. This
usually means that those students are faced with the burden of paying the difference.
Naturally, it could be stated that the Bureau is at fault, but to this writer, economic
realities mandate that the solution lies in the invalidity of state regulations for out-of-
state tuition.
32. See Indian Self-Determination Act and Education Assistance Act of 1975, P.
Law 93-638, 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1975). See also notes 53, 54, 55 infra.
33. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
34. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
35. The position of tribal citizens today is very similar to that of the English in
America after the Revolutionary War. This issue was determined by the subsequent
adoption of the ideal of volitional allegiance and the concept of popular sovereignty,
with the subsequent rejection of Coke's formulation of subjectship in Calvins Case. See
the excellent article on this topic by Kettner, The Development of American Citizen-
ship in the Revolutionary Era: The Ideal of Volitional Allegiance, 38 Am. J. LEGAL
HISTORY 208 (1974). In their dissent in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
1 (1831), which was requested by Chief Justice Marshall, Justices Thompson and
Story addressed the issue of citizenship and tribal Indians. They concluded that the
members of the Cherokee Nation could not be considered as citizens of the state of
Georgia, because that idea was "entirely inconsistent" with the federal-tribal treaties
and the precedent of the state courts. Id. at 66. They concluded that if the members
of the Cherokee Nation were "not citizens, they must be aliens or foreigners, and such
must be the character of each individual belonging to the [Cherokee] nation." Id.
Moreover, they cited with approval Chancellor James Kent's opinion in Jackson v.
Goode], zo Johns Rep. 188, 193 (N.Y.S.C. 1822). This case involved the citizenship
of an Oneida Indian, who had received a patent to the lands in question from the
federal government because of his participation in the Revolutionary War as an officer
for the colonies. The lower court had determined that he was a citizen, but Chancellor
Kent held that, "In my view, they [the Oneida Indians] have never been regarded as
citizens, or members of our [state of New York] body politic. They have always been
and still are considered by our laws as dependent tribes, governed by their own usages
and chiefs, but placed under our protection and subject to our coercion, so far as the
public safety requires it, and no further .... No argument can be drawn against the
sovereignty of these Indian nations, from the fact of their having put themselves and
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their land under the protection of the British crown; such a fact is of frequent occur-
rence between independent nations. One community may be bound to another by a
very unequal alliance, and still be a sovereign state. Vat. B. i., ch. l6, section 194. The
Indians, though born within our territorial limits, are considered as born under the
dominion of their own tribes." Id. at 66-67; Goodell v. Jackson, 2o Johns Rep. 693,
712 (N.Y. Ct. Eu. 1823), reversing Jackson v. Goodell. Accord, Lee v. Glover, 8
Lowen 189 (N.Y.S.C. 1828); Comet v. Winton, 2 Yergen 143 (Tenn. S.C. 1826);
Murray v. Wooden, 17 Wendell 531 (N.Y.S.C. 1837). See also State ex rel. Marsh v.
District of York, 3 Bailey 215 (S.C. Ct. App. 1829) (race of people considered
separate and distinct class theory rather than political allegiance). Thus, it was not the
place of birth that determined citizenship, but the political choice of the Indians.
36. 83 U.S. (i6 Wall.) 36, 39 (1873).
37. 6o U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
38. Id. at 404. It should be noted that ten years later in United States v. Holliday,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866), the Court held that a grant of citizenship by the state
of Minnesota to an Indian did not alter his special status as a tribal member.
39. Effect of the Fourteenth Amendment upon Indian Tribes, 41st Cong., 3d
Sess., S. Rep. No. 268 (1870). This report put to rest any argument that the
inclusiveness of section i of the fourteenth amendment included all native-born tribal
members under the phrase . . . "subject to the jurisdiction, thereof are citizens of the
United States and of the States wherein they reside." Because the Indian tribes were
subject to the Constitution and to the laws of Congress, there was a strong presump-
tion that the tribes were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, The "four-
teenth amendment to the Constitution," the Report began, "has no effect whatever
upon the status of Indian tribes within the limits of the United States, and does not
annul the treaties previously made between them and the United States." Id. at 1.
"The Indians, in tribal condition," the report continued, "have never been subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, in the sense in which the term jurisdiction is
employed in the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. The government has
asserted a political supremacy over the Indians ...separate from the States of the
Union within whose limits they are located, and exempt from the operation of State
laws; and not othervise subject to the control of the United States than is consistent
with their character as separate political communities or states." Id. at 9-lo. The
matter of taxation was also commented on by the Report. It suggested that the reason
the fourteenth amendment retained the provision "excluding Indians not taxed" from
the Constitution, while excluding "three-fifths of all other persons," established an
irresistible inference "that the amendment was intended to recognize no change in the
status of Indians." Id. at io. The Report concluded that, "The Indians were excluded
because they were not citizens." Id.
40. 6 Sawyer 406 (188o). See also McKay v. Campbell, 16 F. 161, 165-66 (D.
Ore. 1871).
41. 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
42. 6 Sawyer 406, 409 (1880).
43- 112 U.S. 94, 102, 103 (1884).
44- See Treaty with Cherokees, July i8, 1817, which provided that an allotment in
fee simple of a section of land was to be made to all heads of Indian families "who
may wish to become citizens of the United States." 7 Stat. 156. Accord, art. XIV,
Choctaw Treaty of 1830, 7 Stat. 333. See also Stockbridge Tribe of Indians Treaty of
1848, 9 Stat. 955 and Treaty of 1856, 11 Stat. 663. For example of a treaty where
the entire tribe exchanged its tribal organization for the privilege of full citizenship,
see Treaty with the Wyandott Tribe, Jan. 31, 1855, 10 Stat. 1159 and Treaty with
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Ottawa Indians of Blanchard's Fork and Roche de Beuf, 12 Stat. 1237 (3867) See also
35 Stat. 413. Another common procedure in treaties is illustrated by art. VIII of the
Treaty of 1858, 12 Stat. 1037. See further, Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) for
discussion.
45. See 15 Stat. 635; 24 Stat. 388; 31 Stat. 1447; 41 Stat. 350.
46. 43 Stat. ch. 233 (p. 253). The constitutionality of this act has never been
asserted in federal courts. It should be noted, however, that in the case of Ozawa v.
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922), the Supreme Court suggested that it was not
possible for a tribal Indian to be a naturalized citizen of the United States. The Ozawa
case concerned a Japanese person living in Hawaii. He had applied for naturalization as
a United States citizen in the United States District Court for the Territory of Hawaii.
The district court denied his petition on the grounds that he was a person of the
Japanese race and not eligible for naturalization under Section 2169 of the Revised
Statute which read: "The provisions of this Title shall apply to aliens, being free white
persons, and aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent." Id. at 19o.
The Supreme Court held that the meaning of the original Act was clear. "It may be
true that these two races [Negroes and Indians] were alone thought of as being ex-
cluded, but to say that they were the only ones within the intent of the statute would
be to ignore the affirmative form of the legislation. The provision is not that Negroes
and Indians shall be excluded but it is, in effect, that only free white persons shall be
included. The intention was to confer the privilege of citizenship upon that class of
persons whom the fathers knew as white, and to deny it to all who could not be so classi-
fied." Id. at 195. The Court indicated, however, that it was unnecessary to determine
precisely what groups the Congress intended to exclude under the naturalization laws.
The Court stated, "It is sufficient to ascertain whom they intended to include and
having ascertained that it follows, as a necessary corollary, that all others are to be
excluded." Id. at 196. The Court concluded that Caucasians alone were intended to
be within the original scope of the Naturalization Act until it was amended, after
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